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ABSTRACT
There are currently no requirements (technical or otherwise)
that BGP paths must be contained within national bound-
aries. Indeed, some paths experience international detours,
i.e., originate in one country, cross international boundaries
and return to the same country. In most cases these are sensi-
ble traffic engineering or peering decisions at ISPs that serve
multiple countries. In some cases such detours may be sus-
picious. Characterizing international detours is useful to a
number of players: (a) network engineers trying to diagnose
persistent problems, (b) policy makers aiming at adhering to
certain national communication policies, (c) entrepreneurs
looking for opportunities to deploy new networks, or (d)
privacy-conscious states trying to minimize the amount of
internal communication traversing different jurisdictions.
In this paper we characterize international detours in the
Internet during the month of January 2016. To detect detours
we sample BGP RIBs every 8 hours from 461 RouteViews
and RIPE RIS peers spanning 30 countries. Then geolocate
visible ASes by geolocating each BGP prefix announced by
each AS, mapping its presence at IXPs and geolocation in-
frastructure IPs. Finally, analyze each global BGP RIB en-
try looking for detours. Our analysis shows more than 5K
unique BGP prefixes experienced a detour. A few ASes
cause most detours and a small fraction of prefixes were af-
fected the most. We observe about 544K detours. Detours
either last for a few days or persist the entire month. Out of
all the detours, more than 90% were transient detours that
lasted for 72 hours or less. We also show different countries
experience different characteristics of detours.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We define an international detour (detour for short)
as a BGP path that originates in an AS located in one
country, traverses an AS located in a different coun-
try and returns to an AS in the original country. De-
tours have been observed in the Internet, for example,
cities located in the African continent communicating
via an external exchange point in Europe [11]. Many au-
tonomous systems are also multinational, which means
that routes traversing the AS may cross international
boundaries. There have also been suspicious cases of
detours. In November, 2013, the Internet intelligence
company Renesys (now owned by Dyn) published an
online article detailing an attack they called Targeted
Internet Traffic Misdirection [10]. Using Traceroute
data they discovered three paths that suffered a man-in-
the-middle (MITM) attack. One path originated from
and was destined to organizations in Denver, CO, after
passing through Iceland, prompting concern and un-
comfortable discussions with ISP customers. Each of
these anecdotes, while interesting in its own right, does
not address the broader question about how prevalent
such detours are, their dynamics and impact. Charac-
terizing detours is important to several players: (a) as
a tool for network engineers trying to diagnose prob-
lems; (b) policy makers aiming at adhering to poten-
tial national communication policies mandating that
all intra-country communication be confined within na-
tional boundaries, (c) entrepreneurs looking for oppor-
tunities to deploy new infrastructure in sparsely cov-
ered geographical areas such as Africa, or (d) privacy-
conscious states trying to minimize the amount of in-
ternal communication traversing different jurisdictions.
Using the methodology developed to detect detours we
also present a tool, Netra1, to monitor the Internet
routing system in near real-time and produce alerts.
Network operators can not only appear informed about
the incident, but also may be able to take action in peer
selection in response to the alerts. Finally, longitudinal
analysis of detours can give us insight into how routing
and network infrastructure evolve over time.
In this paper we first develop methodology to detect
detours, validate it on live traffic using our tool Netra
and then use it to characterize them at a global scale on
historical BGP data of January 2016 from RouteViews
and RIPE RIS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we present related work and highlight previous
efforts in direction similar to ours and point out key
1https://github.com/akshah/netra
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areas where our work differs from them. In Section 3
we describe our datasets, corresponding usage and rea-
soning for the choice of our datasets. Section 4 details
the methodology used to perform AS geolocation and
analysis of our geolocation results. Section 5 explains
in detail detour detection process, corresponding termi-
nologies used throughout the paper. In Section 6 we
explain our data plane measurements and present val-
idation results. In Section 7 we characterize detours
seen in January 2016. First we present aggregate anal-
ysis of entire dataset, then classify detours into different
categories and finally focus on transient detours in Sec-
tions 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. In Sections 8 and 9
we discuss value additions of our work, summarize and
present future work respectively.
2. RELATED WORK
Detour detection:
In November 2013 Renesys reported a few suspicious
paths [10]. One went from Guadalajara, Mexico to
Washington, D.C. via Belarus; another went from Den-
ver, CO through Reykjavik, Iceland, back to Denver.
They used mostly data plane information from tracer-
oute for their analysis. In [11] the authors focus on
ISP inter-connectivity in the continent of Africa. They
searched for paths that leave Africa only to return back.
The goal, however, was to investigate large latencies in
Africa and ways to reduce it. The premise was that
if a route crosses international boundaries it would ex-
hibit high latency. The work pointed to cases where
local ISPs are not present at regional IXPs and IXP
participants don’t peer with each other. Similar to Re-
nesys, they also use traceroute measurements, this time
from the BISmark infrastructure (a deployment of home
routers with custom firmware) in South Africa. Our
study extends beyond Africa and investigates transient
in addition to long-lasting detours. In Boomerang [19],
the authors again use traceroute to identify routes from
Canada to Canada that detour through the US. In this
work the motivation was concerns about potential surveil-
lance by the NSA. This work differs from ours in a num-
ber of ways: we characterize detours not just for one
but 30 countries using control plane information rather
than data plane. We use data plane measurement only
for validation purposes. Our goal is to not only detect
detours but show characteristics about them which pre-
vious work does not present.
Data plane vs Control plane Incongruities:
In [9] authors focus on routing policies and point out
cases where routing decisions taken by ASes do not con-
form to expected behavior. There are complex AS re-
lationships, such as, hybrid or partial transit which im-
pact routing. Such relationships may lead to false posi-
tives in our results. However, the paper points out that
most violations of expected routing behavior caused by
complex AS relationships are very few and most viola-
tions were caused by major content providers. Our work
identifies detours for variety of ASes, including both
large content providers and small institutions. More-
over, in [24] authors argue that such incongruities are
caused due to incorrect IP to AS mappings. About 60%
of mismatches occur due to IP sharing between adjacent
ASes. Authors here show that 63% to 88% of paths ob-
served in control plane are valid in data plane as well.
The work in [14] also analyzes the control plane (RIBs
and AS paths) to construct a network topology and
then uses traceroute to construct country-level paths.
The goal of this work was to understand the role of dif-
ferent countries that act as hubs in cross-country Inter-
net paths. Their results show that western countries are
important players in country level internet connectivity.
Malicious AS detection:
In [16] authors present ASwatch, an AS reputation sys-
tem to detect bulletproof hosting ASes. Similar to our
work ASwatch relies on control plane information to de-
tect malicious ASes (that may host botnet C&C servers,
phishing sites, etc). The motivation of this work is dif-
ferent than ours. ASwatch attempts to detect malicious
ASes by mining their link stability, IP space fragmen-
tation and prefix reachability. ASwatch will not de-
tect ASes that cause detours. The detour origin ASes
that our work detects could complement features that
ASwatch uses. As authors in [16] point out malicious
ASes rewire their routes more frequently than legiti-
mate ones, transient detours might be particularly use-
ful to improve detection capability of ASwatch.
Geolocation Accuracy:
In context of MaxMind geolocation accuracy, [12] and
[20] have shown MaxMind country geolocation to be
99.8% in consensus with other geolocation DBs. In [21]
authors use data from Routing Information Registries
(RIRs), RIPE DB and Team Cymru to determine all
IP blocks and ASes that geolocate to Germany. To
validate their geolocation accuracy, authors query the
MaxMind database which allows mapping IP addresses
to their country of presence. We adopt a more exhaus-
tive strategy than [21].
Control-plane-only for detection:
One way to detect detours is to use traceroute, analyze
reported hops and use latency as an indication of a de-
tour. This approach was followed by [11] that studied
peering relationships in Africa; we too use this approach
to validate our results on live data. However, we detect
detours using only control plane data. This has a num-
ber of advantages: 1) Collecting data plane information
at an Internet scale is hard. It needs infrastructure and
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visibility provided by Atlas probes or Ark monitors is
limited. Moreover, running too many traceroutes from
own network to others might lead to blacklisting. 2)
Small footprint of our methodology makes it easily re-
producible. Any network operator can pull a RIB dump
from his/her border router and run Netra to detect de-
tours for prefixes they own.
3. DATA SOURCES
We use variety of data sources to perform AS geolo-
cation, BGP RIBS for detour detection and Traceroutes
from RIPE Atlas for detour validation. In Table 1 we
list different datasets with their usage and relevant in-
formation about each. Our sampling rate is 3 RIBs per
day (one every eight hours, as provided by RIPE RIS)
for a total of 38,688 RIBs from 416 peers. This spans 30
countries, which amounts to about 55GB of compressed
MRT data. We acknowledge that 30 countries do not
necessarily represent global scale, but our scope is lim-
ited by placement of peers that provide BGP feeds. We
used all v4 peers in our analysis.
For geolocation of IP addresses we use MaxMind Ge-
oLite City DB [17]. We treat end user IPs and infras-
tructure IPs differently since MaxMind is known to be
more accurate for eye-ball networks only. To gather the
list of infrastructure IPs we used list of routers from
CAIDA Ark traceroutes [1], OpenIPMap [8], iPlane [5]
and RIPE Atlas built-in measurements and the anchor-
ing measurements. The built-in measurements use all
the RIPE Atlas probes and the destinations are root
servers. The anchoring measurements are from 400 At-
las probes to other 189 Atlas anchors. These infrastruc-
ture IPs are then mapped to AS using IP to AS map-
pings from CAIDA ITDK [4], iPlane or longest prefix
match.
In addition to BGP sources, we use AS-to-IXP map-
ping to estimate presence of an AS in a country. We
gather AS to IXP mappings from Packet Clearing House
(PCH) [6], PeeringDB [7] and by crawling 368 IXP web-
sites that make their participant list public. Finally, we
use CAIDA AS Relationship datasets [3] to eliminate
false positives from detours detected. In Section 4 we
provide more details on how these datasets are used in
AS geolocation along with a flowchart (Figure 1).
4. AS GEOLOCATION
To detect detours we are interested in country level
geolocation. We define AS geolocation as presence of
an AS in a country. An AS can have presence in mul-
tiple countries, especially ASes that belong to large
providers. We detect the presence of an AS in coun-
try A if it :
1. Announces a prefix that geolocates to A or
2. Has infrastructure IPs that geolocate to A or
3. Has a presence at an IXP in A.
In Figure 1 we show a flowchart detailing AS geolo-
cation processes. There are 3 main steps as described
above. In next sections we elaborate on each.
4.1 Prefix Geolocation
We begin by geolocating all advertised BGP prefixes
by an AS. It is possible that during our analysis in Jan-
uary 2016 some AS erroneously announced prefixes that
it did not own. Therefore we perform a simple filtering;
we trust an AS to be owner of a prefix if it announced
the prefix for at least 15 days in our dataset. We assume
most mistakes or hijacks will be less than this duration.
Next, to map a BGP prefix to a country we geolocate
each IP in the prefix using MaxMind-free. MaxMind
could not geolocate 3.8M IPs. We could successfully
geolocate 1.48M of these IPs with MaxMind-paid, we
could not use remaining 2.32M IPs. Now we use the
union of IP geolocation sets to get the BGP prefix ge-
olocation. Due to the 2.32M IPs not geolocating even
with paid version of MaxMind, 614 BGP prefixes could
not be geolocated. For the remaining 610,722 BGP pre-
fixes2 which were geolocated we observe that more than
99% geolocated to single country. We note that 328,398
BGP prefixes were /24s. When BGP prefixes map to
more than one country, the average size of the set was
2.9 countries. Finally, we perform union of geolocation
sets of all BGP prefixes that an AS announces to create
1st AS to country set.
4.2 Infrastructure IP Geolocation
As mentioned previously, we treat infrastructure IP
addresses separately. Router geolocation is known to be
inaccurate [15]. Therefore for these IPs we want to cre-
ate country geolocation set as large as possible. We pop-
ulate list of router IPs from CAIDA Ark Traceroutes,
iPlane IP to PoP mappings, OpenIPMap and RIPE
built in measurements. Our list included 3M router
IPs. This is the ‘Read Infrastructure IPs’ step shown in
flowchart Figure 1. To geolocate each router IP we look
at country location provided by iPlane, OpenIPMap3
and Maxmind-paid and perform a union to give a set of
countries. Next step is to map these routers to ASes.
IP to AS is a challenging problem and active area of
research. We use the best datasets available to cre-
ate these mappings. Both CAIDA ITDK and iPlane
datasets provide IP to AS mappings using the method-
ology described in [13]. For cases where either of these
datasets fail to provide IP to AS mapping, we perform
2We use BGP prefixes ‘as is’ from the RIBs and do not perform
any prefix aggregation. For example, if both /8 and /9 blocks of
a prefix were seen in RIBs of the same or different peers, they are
treated as 2 separate prefixes.
3OpenIPMap is crowdsourced and may not be very accurate. We
use cases where confidence level for router geolocation is higher
than 90%.
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Table 1: Dataset Description
Name Usage Date Sources Info
BGP
AS Geolocation;
Detour Detection
2016-01
RouteViews, RIPE
RIS
38,688 RIBS, 416 peers,
30 countries, 55GB
Infrastructure IP
List
AS Geolocation 2016-01 to 2016-03
CAIDA Ark, iPlane,
OpenIPMap, RIPE
Atlas Measurements
3M Router IPs
Infrastructure IPs
to AS Mapping
Infrastructure IP
geolocation
2015-08 CAIDA ITDK, iPlane 6.6M IP to AS mappings
AS to IXP
Mapping
AS Geolocation 2016-01 to 2016-03
IXP websites,
PeeringDB, PCH
368 IXP websites
crawled
AS Relationship
Filtering peered
paths from detection
2016-01
CAIDA AS
Relationship
482,657 distinct
relationships
Traceroute Detour Validation 2016-05-01 RIPE Atlas
Used by Netra, 163
traceroutes
MaxMind
Prefix Geolocation;
Detour Validation
2016-01, 2016-03
MaxMind GeoLite
City (free and paid)
Paid version used only
for geolocating
infrastructure IPs and
detour validation
longest prefix match on the global routing table and
map the IP to the AS announcing the longest matching
prefix. Lastly, we combine IP to Country and IP to AS
mappings to give 2nd AS to country set.
4.3 IXP Presence of an AS
We extract presence of ASes at different IXPs and
add the geolocation of IXP to the AS geolocation. As
shown in ‘Read IXP data’ step in Figure 1, we use 3
sources of AS to IXP mappings. First, we crawl 368 IXP
websites and extract their corresponding participants.
Next, we use PeeringDB 2.0 API [7] and lastly, we use
dataset from Packet Clearing House (PCH) that lists
participants at IXPs that PCH is also a part of. We then
combine geolocation obtained from these IXP sources to
obtain 3rd AS to country set. We acknowledge that IXP
mappings from websites, PCH and PeeringDB might
not be updated regularly and hence lead to mapping of
an AS to a country that it does not have a presence
in. Note that this will lead to false negative (not false
positives) in detour detection, a trade-off we make to
error on safe side.
4.4 AS to Country Set
Finally, we map an AS to a set of countries by tak-
ing a union of all the 3 steps above. This is the merge
step in Figure 1. The distribution of AS geolocation
is shown in Figure 2. Perhaps surprisingly, only about
11.6% ASes out of a total of 52,984 geolocated to mul-
tiple countries. We believe that this is the result of a
practice where most organizations use a different AS
number in different countries. If an AS does geolocate
to multiple countries we use the set of all countries in
our analysis. We could not geolocate 24 ASes because
none of their BGP prefixes could be geolocated, no in-
frastructure IP from our set mapped to it nor did we
find its IXP presence in public datasets. These ASes on
an average announced only 2 to 3 BGP prefixes.
Figure 2: CDF: Number of countries in AS geolocation
Comparison with CAIDA’s AS Rank:
Although our end goal is to detect detours, these geolo-
cation results provide interesting insights. To under-
stand more about which ASes geolocate to more than
one country we use CAIDA’s AS Rank [2]. This dataset
gives higher ranks to ASes that have large customer
cones. Intuitively, ASes with higher rank should re-
solve to many countries due to their wider presence.
Table 2 shows ASes with their CAIDA AS rank and
corresponding number of countries the AS geolocated
to for top 3 and bottom 3 in the first 1000 ranked ASes.
As expected, we see that ASes which have large pres-
ence with many customers across the world geolocate
to large number of countries and low rank ASes with
smaller customer cones geolocate to fewer countries.
5. DETOUR DETECTION
We define a path as having a detour if the origin
and destination is country ‘A’ but the path unambigu-
ously includes some other country ‘B’. Note that this
approach examines paths where the prefix origin AS and
the AS where the peer is located are in the same coun-
try. To analyze the AS path, we provide the following
definitions:
• Prefix Origin: The AS that announces the BGP
prefix.
• Detour Origin AS: The AS that starts a de-
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Figure 1: Flowchart: AS-to-Country mapping creation
tour in country ‘A’ and diverts the path to foreign
country ‘B’.
• Detour Origin Country: The country where we
approximate location of Detour Origin AS, coun-
try ‘A’.
• Detour Destination AS: The AS in foreign coun-
try ‘B’.
• Detour Return AS: The AS where detour re-
turns back in country ‘A’.
Figure 3: Example showing direction of BGP an-
nouncement and direction of observed detour
Figure 3 illustrates detours. AS0 announces prefix
a.b.c.0/24 to AS1, AS2 and AS3. AS1 geolocates to JP
whereas AS3, AS2 and AS0 are in the US. In this case,
data traversing from AS3 to AS0 will contain a detour
from AS2 (Detour Origin) to AS1 (Detour Destination).
We do not include sub-paths in our analysis; other por-
tions of the path that may experience a detour. For ex-
ample, in path AS1{US}-AS2{IN}-AS3{CN}-AS4{IN}-
AS5{US}, we only count the detour US-IN-US. We do
not count the detour IN-CN-IN.
There are some cases where we need to approximate
detour origin and country. In a path such as AS1{US}-
AS2{US,BR}-AS3{CN}-AS4{US}. We resolve the un-
certainty of the detour origin by assuming that it starts
in AS2, since there is a likely path to AS2 from AS1
through the US and AS2 starts the detour from US,
not BR. We do not characterize possible detours. For
example, a path that geolocates to {US}-{US,IN}-{US}
may in fact stay within the US and never visit India. In
this work we only focus on paths that contain definite
detours, such as {US}-{IN}-{US} or {US}-{IN,CN}-
{US}. Again, we re-emphasize that in this work we only
look at paths that confidently start and end in the same
country; paths like {US,BR}-{IN}-{US} or {US}-{IN}-
{BR} are not considered. We discard paths where we
see an AS whose geolocation is unknown and a detour is
not certain. For example, paths like AS1{US}-AS2{}-
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Table 2: Comparison of CAIDA’s AS Rank with number of countries in AS Geolocation
AS Rank ASN Customer Cone Size AS Name #Countries
1 3356 24,553 Level 3 Communications 63
2 174 17,891 Cogent Communications 58
3 3257 16,963 Tinet Spa 34
998 25394 18 MK Netzdienste GmbH Co. KG 2
999 6724 18 Strato AG 4
1000 52925 18
Ascenty DataCenters Locacao e
Servicos LTDA
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AS3{US} are discarded. However, if we see the detour
occurring before the AS that could not be geolocated we
do count it as a valid detour i.e., in AS1{US}-AS2{BR}-
AS3{US}-AS4{}-AS5{US}, AS4 does not have geolo-
cation information but the US-BR-US detour occurred
earlier. We treat this path as definite detour. We note
that in addition to geolocation accuracy there is also
some ambiguity about exact country boundaries. Some
territories and relationships are currently disputed be-
tween multiple authorities and no worldwide consensus
exists. For example, Hong-Kong and the People’s Re-
public of China could be considered one or two entities.
Hong-Kong is affiliated with China but it is a charter
city and has its own independent constitution and ju-
diciary system. For our analysis, we left the resolution
of boundaries and countries to the MaxMind database.
With this particular example, Hong-Kong and China
are treated as two separate entities. MaxMind follows
ISO 3166 country codes. In some cases the geolocation
from MaxMind is ambiguous: ‘A1:Anonymous Proxy’,
‘A2: Satellite Provider’, ‘O1: Other Country’, ‘EU: Eu-
rope’, ‘AP: Asia/Pacific’. We discard detours caused by
these ambiguous codes, such as {DE}-{EU}-{DE}.
Filtering peered AS paths:
It is possible that the detour origin and the detour re-
turn ASes have a peering relationship and in reality
traffic was not detoured at all. This, however, is hard
to determine with certainty since peering relations and
policies are not public. What we can do is provide an
upper bound on how many detours may be eliminated
due to peering. To detect such cases we use CAIDA’s
AS relationship dataset [3]. This dataset provides in-
formation of provider to provider (p2p) and provider to
customer (p2c) relationship between ASes. We count
cases where p2p link might be used, i.e., data originates
from the peer itself or from a downstream customer. In
case of p2c link we assume this link is always chosen.
We eliminate such paths from our analysis and revisit
this issue in the next section summarizing the peering
relationships in Table 4.
Multi-Origin Prefixes:
Some prefixes are announced by more than one ASes.
We do not eliminate such cases. So, if a prefix a.b.c.0/24
is seen in RIBs of 2 peers with AS paths ‘X Y Z’ and
‘P Q R’ then we treat each path as independent and
detect detour if it fits above mentioned criteria of start-
ing and ending in the same country. In our geolocation
dataset we observed 7,579 prefixes of multi-origin (7,247
originated from 2 ASes). Out of these 6,104 suffered a
detour. Motivation to not eliminate these prefixes is as
follows: Network operators of such prefixes might want
to re-evaluate their decisions especially if the ASes orig-
inating the prefix are in different countries. This might
be a cause of high latency.
6. DETOUR VALIDATION
In this section we validate detours in near real time
using traceroutes from RIPE Atlas probes. Our valida-
tion comprises of four steps:
1. Run Netra with live BGP feeds from 416 peers to
detect detours.
2. When a detour is detected, run corresponding tracer-
outes (from same country and same AS) using
RIPE Atlas.
3. Check if the traceroute and detour see similar AS
path.
4. Validate using traceroute IP hops and RTT.
6.1 Data-plane Measurements
We ran Netra from May 2nd 2016 noon to midnight
(using BGP feeds from 416 peers). When a detour
was detected in control plane we selected RIPE Atlas
probes in the same country and same AS which we de-
tected detour from and ran traceroute (ICMP Paris-
traceroute [18]) to IP addresses in the detoured prefix.
The methodology to run data plane measurements is
shown in Figure 4. There are a few cases where more
than two Atlas probes are present in selected AS; in
this case we selected 2 probes that are geographically
farthest from each other. By doing this we aimed to ac-
count for cases where routes seen from geographically
distant vantage points within the same AS are different.
To select target IPs from detoured prefix, we break the
prefix into its constituent /24s and randomly select an
IP from each /24. For example, in a /23 prefix we se-
lect 2 IPs belonging to different /24s. By doing this we
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Figure 4: Data plane measurements: Example showing selection of RIPE Atlas probes and target IPs
account for cases where a large prefix, even though in
the same country, has different connectivity via differ-
ent upstream provider. During this live run we detected
6,175 detours. Out of these 5,787 were unique detours
({peer,prefix,aspath} tuple).
6.2 Selecting Congruent Paths
Only 72 peers saw the 6,175 detours and the 72 peers
belong to only 63 ASes. From these 63 ASes we then se-
lect ASes that also have active RIPE Atlas probes; there
were only 10 ASes that both saw a detour and host a
RIPE Atlas probe. 169 detours were seen from these 10
ASes corresponding to 6 countries: {Brazil, Italy, Nor-
way, Russia, United States, South Africa}. From the
169 traceroutes we initiated to detoured prefixes, we
discard 6 traceroutes where less than 3 hops responded
since drawing detour conclusion from these is not pos-
sible. Finally, we are left with 163 traceroutes that can
be used for validation. We acknowledge that 163 is not
a very large number for validation purposes. However,
running Netra for more hours does not necessarily in-
crease the number of usable traceroutes for validation
by a lot, we are limited by the number of ASes that
have RIPE Atlas probes which also see a detour and
detour-origin and detour-destination have no peering.
In total we detected 85 prefixes (corresponding to the
163 traceroutes) that suffered a detour that was visi-
ble from an AS which has RIPE Atlas probes. Note
that some detoured prefixes were larger than /24, so we
traceroute multiple IPs within it as explained in Sec-
tion 6.1. The validation methodology is stated in Al-
gorithm 1. As previous work [22] has pointed out, we
found many cases where AS path seen in control plane
and AS path seen in data plane do not match. However,
these paths can still show detour if the detour origin AS
and the detour destination AS are still present in the
traceroute observed AS path. We call such AS paths
congruent. More specifically, we consider the detoured
AS path congruent only if detour origin AS and detour
return AS both are present in the traceroute-observed
AS path in the same order (detour origin first). For
example, if an AS path ‘A B C D E’ in control plane
changed to ‘A X B C E’ in data plane where ‘B’ was de-
tour origin and ‘C’ was detour destination, we consider
it as a congruent path. To resolve traceroute path to
AS path we used CAIDA ITDK and iPlane IP to AS
mappings and in cases where no match was found we
use longest prefix match on the global routing table for
the hop IP. Then we map the longest prefix match to
the AS that originated it. Out of all the IPs we saw
in 163 traceroutes, only 44 could be mapped to an AS
using the IP to AS datasets. All other IPs were mapped
using longest prefix match.
We observed 113 congruent AS paths. This includes
3 cases, insertions, deletions and mix of both. We bor-
row nomenclature of these paths from [22]. We saw
73 deletions, 29 insertions, 4 mix of insertion and dele-
tions. The remaining 7 AS paths were exact matches.
Note that these insertions and deletions occurred only
for ASes that were not involved in the detour.
Algorithm 1 Netra Validation
1: procedure validateASPath
2: aspath← AS Path from Traceroute
3: doas← Detour Origin AS from Netra
4: ddas← Detour Destination AS from Netra
5: if doas,ddas in aspath then
6: if doas before ddas in aspath then
7: Return True
1: procedure validateIPHops
2: ipHops← IP hops from Traceroute
3: ipHopCountries← MaxMind-paid
4: if ipHopCountries show detour then
5: detourDestTR← Dest. from traceroute
6: detourDestNetra← Dest. from Netra
7: if detourDestTR in detourDestNetra then
8: Return True
1: procedure validateRTTs
2: hopRTTs← RTTs from Traceroute
3: if hopRTTs show magnitudeJump then
4: Return True
1: procedure main
2: loop: Each Detected Detour
3: if validateASPath then
4: validateIPHops
5: validateRTTs
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6.3 Validation
Now we validate detours detected by our methodol-
ogy by comparing it with detours seen in data plane.
For the 113 congruent AS paths, we evaluate if a data
plane detour was seen. We chose to perform two tests.
First, we resolve IPs observed in the hops of tracer-
oute to country level geolocation using Maxmind-paid.
We detect data plane detour if a path traversed for-
eign country and returned. We make sure that coun-
try visited (detour destination country) in data plane
is present in the set of destination countries expected
for this particular detour by Netra. We do this filter-
ing to avoid false positives like: Netra detected detour
{US}–{GB,DE}–{US} and traceroute detected detour
{US}–{IT}–{US}. Although still a detour, since it was
not accurately captured we count it as a miss. How-
ever, no such case was found. Second, we validate using
RTT measurements. We detect RTT based detour if
a hop in the traceroute showed increase in RTT by an
order of magnitude (at least 10 times increase). The
results of this analysis are shown in Figure 5. We ob-
served accuracy of about 85% (97 out of 113) in country-
wise method and 90% (102 out of 113) by RTT mea-
surements. The overlap between these two different
tests was also large. 88 detours were detected in both
(77.8%).
We investigate further the 9 detours that were seen
in country-wise method but not in RTT. These detours
covered small geographic area; 4 from Italy to France,
2 Norway to Sweden, 2 from Brazil to US and 1 from
Russia to Sweden. RTTs between these countries have
been previously reported to be low. Next we investigate
14 cases which were captured in RTT measurements but
not in country-wise method. All of these do cross inter-
national boundaries. For 12 of these cases, due to large
number of traceroute hops (especially towards the end
of the traceroute) not responding we don’t see the route
returning to the origin country, hence not detected by
country-wise method. We attribute remaining 2 cases
as false positives due to inaccurate AS geolocation.
Figure 5: Validation Results: Live traceroutes using
RIPE Atlas
In Figure 6 we provide a visualization of the most
common detour we observed from Russia. Only visual-
ization is done using OpenIPMap.
Validation Discussion:
We show that large percentage of detours seen in con-
trol plane are accurately reflected in data plane as well.
The main challenge is AS paths in both data plane and
control plane don’t agree in about 30% cases. We note
that this could be an artifact of Atlas probes connected
differently than the peers which provide BGP feeds. It
is, however, possible to learn common AS insertions and
deletions over a period of time and evolve detection ca-
pabilities.
7. RESULTS
In this section we quantify detours detected in Jan-
uary 2016. First, in Section 7.1 we present an overview
of all the detours detected in our dataset. In Section 7.2
we define metrics and classify detours based on their
stability and availability. In Section 7.3 we focus on
transient detours.
7.1 Aggregate Results
We begin by characterizing aggregate results, namely
all detours seen by all peers; in other words, we count an
incident every time an AS path appears in a RIB of any
peer that contains a detour. Many of these incidents are
duplicates. Therefore in addition to the total we also
present the number of unique detours. As expected, we
observe that detours are not generally common. Also,
not all peers see a detour. Only 79 peers, out of 416,
saw one or more detours. Table 3 details the number of
detours seen. We analyzed about 14 billion RIB entries
and about 544K entries showed a detour; out of theses
only 18.9K were unique (most detours re-appear during
the month). Figure 7 shows the number of detours for
each day in January 2016. On an average we find about
17.5K detoured entries per day.
Figure 7: Total number of definite detours per day in
January 2016
Table 3: Aggregate number of detours detected
#Total RIB
Entries
#Detoured
Entries
#Unique
Detours
14,366,653,046 544,484 18,995
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Figure 6: Top Detour on May 2nd 2016: Detected using Netra, visualization using OpenIPMap. Dotted arrow
represents multiple hops and solid arrow represents direct hop.
Table 4: Routes that may have peering relations
#Total Detours
without filtering
peered paths
#Detours with
possible peering
%
659,569 115,085 17.4%
Next we examine the visibility of detours, where we
observe an uneven distribution among ASes. Just 9
ASes originate more than 50% of the detours. Similarly,
some prefixes experience detours more than others. 132
prefixes experienced more than 50% of the total detours.
Looking at the average length of a detour, we see that
a detour visits 1 to 2 foreign ASes before returning to
its origin country.
Impact of Peering:
We now estimate the effect of peering links on detours.
Specifically, we are interested in cases where a peering
relationship exists between the Detour Origin AS and
the Detour Return AS as described in Section 5 using
CAIDA AS relationship dataset. If such a link exists, it
is possible that traffic traverses that link instead of the
detour. Table 4 shows the number of detours between
ASes that also have peering relations compared to total
number of detours without filtering peered paths. We
find that 17.4% of the detours are avoided due to peer-
ing relations. We do not count these as detours in our
analysis.
Top Detour Origins and Prefixes:
To understand more about the nature of these detours,
we focus on the origin and destination ASes. In Table 5
we show the common detour origins and country where
the AS was approximated to origin the detour from.
Next is the percentage of detours out of the total that
started from given origin. Following the percentage, is
the most frequent destination that was visited from the
origin, and lastly is the percentage of detours that went
to most common destination from the said origin. We
observe that most commonly these were access provider
ASes. Similarly, in Table 6 we show top impacted pre-
fixes.
Country-wise analysis:
To provide an understanding on number of detours per
peer in each country we normalize the data by divid-
ing the number of detours by number of peers in the
country. The reason to normalize data is simple, Route-
Views and RIPE RIS peers are not evenly distributed
among different countries. Therefore it is possible that
more detours are seen in countries that have more peers
due to more visibility. An average number of detours
per peer per country provides better insight. Out of 30
countries, only 12 countries observed a detour. Figure 8
shows average number of detours per country. Russia
showed most number of average detours. Understand-
ing the total number of detours in different countries
is important but it does not reflect if detours seen in
different countries have different characteristics. In the
next section we focus on characterizing these detours.
7.2 Characterizing Detours
To characterize detours we define two metrics:
1. Detour Dynamics
(a) Flap Rate: Measure of stability of a detour;
how many times a detour disappeared and
reappeared.
(b) Duty Cycle: Measure of uptime of a detour
throughout the month measurement period.
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Table 5: Top Detour Origin ASNs for all detoured paths
Top Detour Origin AS Total %
Frequent Detour
Destination AS
% to frequent
destination
3356 (Level 3
Communications,BR)
8.39%
32787
(Prolexic-Technologies
DDoS Mitigation Network)
30.99%
12956 (Telefonica
International Wholesale
Services,BR)
5.74% 262182 Media Networks
Latin America
46.33%
6939 (Hurricane
Electric,US)
4.99% 45932 (Net Sys
International Limited)
15.9%
Table 6: Top Detoured prefixes and corresponding percentages
Prefix Affected Total %
Frequent Detour
Destination AS
% to frequent
destination
199.253.181.0/24
(Internet Systems
Consortium,US)
0.51% 766 (Entidad Publica
Empresarial Red)
100%
167.220.28.0/23
(Microsoft,US)
0.51% 6584 (Microsoft Corp) 100%
199.6.5.0/24 (Internet
Systems Consortium,US)
0.51% 766 (Entidad Publica
Empresarial Red)
77.11%
Figure 8: Average number of detours per country
2. Persistence: Total number of continuous hours a
prefix was seen detoured.
Before using the above metrics to characterize the
detours, we perform data pruning to avoid skewing of
data towards ASes that have more peers that provide
BGP feeds to RouteViews and RIPE RIS. Also, ASes
with multiple peers and similar views can contribute
duplicate detours to our dataset. We follow a simple
approach to deal with this problem: if an AS contains
more than one peer we select the peer that saw the most
detours as the representative of that AS. This may po-
tentially undercount detours since some peers in same
AS may see different detours. After selecting a repre-
sentative we are left with 36 (out of 79) peers. We now
continue our characterization of detours by looking at
detour dynamics. Specifically we focus on flap rate
and duty cycle, defined as follows:
FlapRate =
TotalTransitions
TotalT ime
× 100
DutyCycle =
TotalUptime
TotalT ime
× 100
These metrics provide insights into the life cycle of de-
tours by measuring route uptime and stability. BGP
route flapping is a known problem and has been stud-
ied in [23] by looking at BGP updates and RFC 2439
provides methods to dampen these. However, in con-
text of this paper duty cycle and flap rate are calculated
from the RIBs. We extract detours from the RIBs and
evaluate when they disappear and reappear.
To understand if country where detours occur plays
a role in detour dynamics, next we drill into country
specific detours. Figure 9 shows a scatter plot of flap
rate vs. duty cycle for various detours in US, Brazil
and Russia. We selected these three countries because
they show the most detours in our dataset; they account
for 93% of detours. We see a triangular pattern with
some outliers. Large number of detours show high duty
cycle and low flap rate. We divide each figure into 4
quadrants based on average flap rate and average duty
cycle of all detours. We name quadrants anti-clockwise
starting from top right. US detoured paths appear more
stable (lower flap rate and higher duty cycle) in IInd
quadrant. On the other hand, Russian and Brazilian
detoured paths fall mostly in the Ist, IIIrd and IV th
quadrant. Russian detours in general showed lower duty
cycle than US and Brazil. We also present a similar
scatter plot for all the non US, BR and RU detours in
Figure 10. In this case we observed detours mostly in
extreme ends on IInd and IIIrd quadrant indicating
two categories of detours, either long lasting or very
rare events. A network operator can use information
like this and decide which quadrant detours are more
interesting to focus on. While all of detours may need
attention, we believe detours with low duty cycle and
low flap rate may need immediate attention. We talk
more about this in Section 7.3.
Next, we examine the persistence of detours. Fig-
ure 11 shows the number of consecutive days a detour
was visible by any peer. Note that persistence is mea-
sured in number of consecutive hours hence captures
different characteristics than duty cycle which measures
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Figure 9: Flap Rate vs DC for US, RU and BR prefixes
Figure 10: Flap Rate vs DC for Non US, RU and BR
prefixes
uptime throughout the dataset. We see a U-shaped pat-
tern in Figure 11, meaning that many detours are either
short lived (one day) or they persist for entire month.
We take a different view at persistence in Figure 12 by
plotting CDF of duration in hours. We see that most
detours are short-lived, with about 92% lasting less than
72 hours, defined as transient detours. Finally, we ex-
amine a specific case of a transient detour, namely flash
detours which appeared only once and never appeared
again during the month.
In the following section we focus on transient and
flash detours. Due to space limitations we do not char-
acterize persistent detours further. We do note, how-
ever, that characterizing persistent detours is important
for at least some of the reasons we enumerated earlier.
We chose to focus on transient detours as they shed
light on misconfigurations or even malicious activities,
both aspects of routing we understand less.
Figure 11: Persistence of definite detoured paths as
seen by all peers
Figure 12: Distribution of detour duration
Figure 13: Average number of transient detours per
country
7.3 Transient and Flash Detours
We first present an understanding of the transient
detours on per-country basis. Since there are more
than one peers in some countries and different peers
see varying number of transient detours, we calculate
an average number of transient detours per country by
dividing total number of transient detours in a country
by number of peers in the given country. This average
value per country is presented in Figure 13. We de-
tected transient detours in only 8 countries where Rus-
sia topped the list. In comparison to Figure 8 Italy
and India showed more average number of transient de-
tours than US. Figures 14 and 15 show a distribution
of ASes that initiate detours and prefixes affected by
detours. We observe that 4 ASes originate 50% of the
transient detours and only 30 prefixes account for 50%
of the transient detours. Similar to Table 5, shown in
Table 7 are the most common transient detour origins
and Table 8 shows top impacted prefixes by transient
detours. AS9002, RETN-AS, started the most num-
ber of transient detours in our dataset. We note that in
ASWatch [16] authors gathered ground-truth data from
security blogs which enlisted AS9002 as a malicious AS.
Another previously know malicious AS that appeared in
our findings was AS49934 as a detour destination for 7
Russian prefixes. AS49934 is currently unassigned. It
was assigned in Ukraine between 2009-10-14 and 2016-
01-03 and was known to announce bogus prefixes and
host bots.
Finally, we look at flash detours. These are detours
that appeared only once and were observed in only one
11
Table 7: Top Transient Detour Origin ASNs
Transient Detour Origin
AS
Total %
Frequent Detour
Destination AS
% to frequent
destination
9002 (RETN-AS RETN
Limited,RU)
22.64% 2914 (NTT America) 99.07%
6939 (Hurricane
Electric,IT)
10.94% 8551 (Bezeq International) 100%
1299 (TELIANET,IT) 10.87% 8708 (RCS-RDS) 100%
Table 8: Prefixes affected the most by transient detoured BGP paths
Prefix Affected Total %
Frequent Detour
Destination AS
% to frequent
destination
178.79.218.0/23
(Limelight Networks, Inc,
IT)
5.5% 8551 (Bezeq International,
IL)
100%
185.19.164.0/22 (Digi
Italy S.R.L, IT)
5.5% 8708 (RCS-RDS, RO) 100%
46.21.30.0/24 (Tekka
Digital, IT)
5.5% 8758 (Iway, CH) 67.08%
Figure 14: Distribution of ASes that originated a tran-
sient detour. The top 4 Detour Origin ASes account for
50% of all transient detours
Figure 15: Distribution of prefixes that experienced a
transient detour. About 30 prefixes account for 50% of
all transient detours
RIB of a peer. Flash detours account for 26% of the
transient detours, 328 prefixes (6% of all prefixes that
suffered detour) experienced at least one flash detour.
Owners of the prefix which suffered flash detours might
be interested to know such findings. While 328 prefixes
suffered flash detours in our dataset, due to space limi-
tation we point out a few interesting ones in Table 9.
The list in Table 9 raises serious concerns. Data from
government agencies, banks, insurance companies can
easily be subject to wiretapping once it leaves national
boundaries. Based on our control-plane only data, it is
not possible to verify if these institutions were attacked
or not. Nevertheless, we believe our findings will mo-
tivate network operators to look more closely into why
their prefix detoured and if they intended it to happen.
8. DISCUSSION
In this paper we present a first attempt to character-
ize detours in the Internet. We sampled BGP routing
tables from 416 peers around the world over the entire
month of January 2016 to investigate international de-
tours. We see about 18.9K distinct entries in RIBs that
show a detour. More than 90% of the detours last less
than 72 hours. We also discover that a few ASes cause
most of the detours and detours affect a small fraction
of prefixes. Some detours appear only once. Our work
is the first to present different types of detours, namely,
persistent and transient. We also present novel insights
on their characteristics such as detour dynamics in dif-
ferent countries, top impacted prefixes and detour ori-
gins.
Characterizing detours in the Internet is very useful.
Customers gain more insight into how their providers
route traffic. There is perhaps an expectation from
users that if they send traffic to other users in the same
country the packets will not step outside national bor-
ders; our work provides evidence to the contrary. Net-
work operators can use our methodology and results for
diagnostic purposes. A sudden change in RTT may be
traced to a detour, or keeping track of what the routing
system does. The latter is important to assure cus-
tomers that their traffic is not subject to monitoring by
other governments.
Our work is useful to regulators and state officials
responsible for network infrastructure, since our work
quantifies information about a practice that may run
afoul of state policy. State officials can use such infor-
mation to assure citizens that their traffic stays within
national borders or direct ISPs to alter their practices.
State agencies that transmit sensitive information may
monitor detours to alert for potential MITM attacks.
For example, we did observe cases where prefixes be-
longing to US Washington state government were de-
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Table 9: Some prefixes affected by flash detours
Prefix Affected Owner Detour Destination
170.61.199.0/24 Mellon Bank, US 28513 (Uninet, MX)
192.230.0.0/20
Washington State Department of Information
Services, US
7660(Asia Pacific
Advanced Network, JP)
212.11.152.0/21 Moscow Mayor Office, RU 2603(NORDUnet, NO)
208.79.7.0/24 Security Equipment Inc, US 53185(William Roberto
Zago, BR)
161.151.72.0/21
The Prudential Insurance Company of
America, US
2510(Infoweb Fujitsu,
JP)
toured through Japan; and for some detours from Rus-
sia malicious AS49934 appeared as detour destination.
Finally, entrepreneurs may use our results when de-
ciding where to establish new Internet exchange points
(IXP) or deploy infrastructure in developing countries.
Dataset Contributions:
We make the geolocation and detours detection data
available to the community via a public RESTful API
interface. The motivation to do so is as follows. 1)
Network operators can easily query our database and
check if their prefix suffered a detour. 2) Internet mea-
surement researchers can use this information to study
various BGP anomalies such as route leaks, detecting
malicious ASes, etc. Our results on AS and prefix geolo-
cation are available at http://geoinfo.bgpmon.io and
detours results can be accessed at http://detours.
bgpmon.io.
9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
There is an increasing need, fueled by new national
regulations in Europe and Australia, for ISPs to ensure
that personal information belonging to their users does
not leave the country. It is unclear whether such regu-
lations cover data in transit as well as storage, but data
can certainly be sniffed while in transit, violating the
original intent. Such regulations may place a substan-
tial burden on ISPs to prove that such data remains
within a country for its entire lifetime, even when it
moves. It is still far from clear what the implications
are on ISP operations. Currently we do not have the
tools to monitor data in transit and state with confi-
dence that data has not left a country, even briefly.
Our work does not solve this problem. Rather, it
lays the ground for an important conversation about
the challenges new regulatory frameworks will pose to
researchers, industry and network operators. Our work
investigates only a small part of the problem, namely
finding the subset of paths where we can detect interna-
tional detours with some confidence. Our work provides
some answers, but also brings attention to the problem
and will hopefully stimulate more work in this new di-
rection. The gauntlet was thrown and we expect a lot
more research in this area.
Within its scope, we believe our work was executed
carefully by taking into account measurements from
both control and data planes. We show that for the
cases were able to study there is agreement between
the two planes. This is a significant result. Equally sig-
nificant, our work has also illuminated the difficulties in
expanding the scope within the existing measurement
infrastructures. One of the main difficulties we encoun-
tered for example, is finding measurement points with
both control (BGP peers) and data (RIPE probes) mon-
itors to correlate results. This problem cannot be easily
solved, it would take substantial effort to scale the ex-
isting infrastructures by an order of magnitude or more.
Another important obstacle is lack of knowledge about
peering relationships between ASes. This is also a hard
problem to solve, since such relationships are not read-
ily disclosed. It is interesting, however, to contemplate
the issue if regulatory requirements require such disclo-
sures.
Based on our results, we believe that it will be hard
to solve this problem without substantial data plane
monitor deployment to corroborate control plane mea-
surements. ISPs and IXPs may be required to install
sophisticated data plane probe infrastructures and ge-
olocation databases may have to become far more ac-
curate for infrastructure IP addresses in order to de-
tect international detours with some certainty. Control
plane monitoring is still very important as it provides
efficient global monitoring and can immediately flag po-
tential anomalies where data plane monitoring should
be directed. Our work shows that it is effective and
should be expanded.
In the future we plan to continue to build a system
that detects international detours in real time. It is very
apparent that we need to include both control and data
plane measurements and study algorithms that take in-
put from both. Our first goal is to provide ISPs with a
tool to alert when a detour has taken place, followed by
information about it (origin and destination AS, dura-
tion, source and amount of data in the ISP that followed
the detour). We also plan to study emerging regulatory
requirements and provide feedback about the challenges
they pose.
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